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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Respondent, :
v.

:

DARYL WAYNE SEAGROVES,

:

Case No. 890154-CA

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant. :
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This appeal is from a conviction for aggravated
assault, a felony of the second degree in violation of Utah Code
Ann. S 76-5-103 (1978), and assault, a class B misdemeanor in
violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-102 (1978).

Defendant pled

guilty to misdemeanor assault prior to his trial by jury on
aggravated assault in Fifth District Court, in and for Iron
County, the Honorable J. Philip Eves, judge, presiding.

This

Court has jurisdiction in this case pursuant to Utah Code Ann.
S 77-35-26(2)(a) (Supp. 1989) and Utah Code Ann. S 78-21-3(2)(h)
(1988).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Whether the trial court abused its discretion in
sentencing defendant to six months in jail for the misdemeanor
assault conviction to run consecutively to a prison term of up to
five years for the aggravated assault conviction.

Defendant does

not contest the validity of his convictions for aggravated
assault and assault; his claim of error is limited to the

propriety of the consecutive sentences which, he claims, serve to
frustrate the "constitutional function" of the board of pardons.
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
Utah Code Ann. S 76-5-102 (1978):
Assault—(1) Assault is:
(a) An attempt, with unlawful force or
violence, to do bodily injury to another; or
(b) A threat, accompanied by a show of
immediate force or violence, to do bodily
injury to another.
(2) Assault is a class B misdemeanor.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978):
Aggravated assault—(1) A person commits
aggravated assault if he commits assault as
defined in section 76-5-102 and:
(a) He intentionally causes serious bodily
injury to another; or
(b) He uses a deadly weapon or such means
or force likely to produce death or serious
bodily injury.
(2) Aggravated assault is a felony of the
third degree.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201(1) (Supp. 1988):
Within the limits prescribed by this chapter,
a court may sentence a person adjudged guilty
of an offense to any one of the following
sentences or combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from disqualification of
public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise
specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment; or
(e) to death.
Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-202(1) (Supp. 1988):
Every person who is committed to the state
prison to serve an indeterminate term and who
thereafter is released on parole shall, upon
completion of three years on parole without
violation, or in the case of a person
convicted of violating section 76-5-301.1,
Subsection 76-5-302(1)(e), section 76-5-402,
section 76-5-402.1, section 76-5-402.2,
section 76-5-402.3, section 76-5-403.1,
_o_

section 76-5-404, section 76-5-404.1, or
section 76-5-405, or attempting to violate
any of those sections, upon completition of
ten years on parole, without violation, be
terminated from his sentence, unless the
person is earlier terminated by the board of
pardons. Any person who violates the terms
of his parole, while serving parole, shall at
the discretion of the board of pardons be
recommitted to prison to serve the portion of
the balance of his term as determitned by the
board of pardons, not to exceed the maximum
term.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(1) (1978) (amended 1989):
Concurrent or consecutive sentences—
Limitations•
(1) Subject to the limitations of subsection
(2) through (5), a court shall determine, if
a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more
than one felony offense, whether to impose
concurrent or consecutive sentences for the
offenses. Sentences for state offenses shall
run concurrently unless the court states, in
the sentence, that they shall run
consecutively.
Utah Code Ann. § 76-3-401(9) (Supp. 1989):
Concurrent or consecutive sentences—
Limitations.
(9) This section may not be construed to
limit the authority of a court to impose
consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases.
Utah Code Ann. S 77-27-5 (Supp. 1989):
(l)(a) The Board of Pardons shall determine
by majority decision when and under what
conditions, subject to this chapter and other
laws of the state, persons committed to serve
sentences in class A misdemeanor cases at
penal or correctional facilities which are
under the jurisdiction of the Department of
Corrections, and all felony cases except
treason or impeachment, or as otherwise
limited by law, may be released upon parole,
pardoned, restitution ordered, or have their
fines, forfeiture, or restitution remitted,
or their sentences commuted or terminated,
(b) No restitution may be ordered, no
fine, forfeiture, or restitution remitted, no
parole, pardon, or commutation granted or

sentence terminated, except after a full
hearing before the board or its appointed
examiner in open session.
(2)(a) In the case of original parole grant
hearings, rehearings, and parole revocation
hearings, timely prior notice of the time and
place of the hearing shall be given to the
defendant, the county attorney's office
responsible for prosecution of the case, the
sentencing court, law enforcement officials
responsible for the defendant's arrest and
conviction, and whenever possible, the victim
or the victim's family.
(b) Notice to the victim, his
representative, or his family shall include
information provided in Section 77-27-9.5,
and any related rules made by the board under
that section. This information shall be
provided in terms that are reasonable for the
lay person to understand.
(3) The determinations and decisions of the
Board of Pardons in cases involving approval
or denial of any action, of paroles, pardons,
commutations or terminations of sentence,
orders of restitution, or remission of fines,
forfeitures, and restitution, are final and
are not subject to judicial review. Nothing
in this section prevents the obtaining or
enforcement of a civil judgment.
(4) Nothing in this chapter may be
construed as a denial of or limitation or the
governor's power to grant respite or
reprieves in all cases of convictions for
offenses against the state, except treason or
conviction or impeachment. However, respites
or reprieves may not extend beyond the next
session of the Board of Pardons and the
board, at that session, shall continue or
terminate the respite or reprieve, or it may
commute the punishment, or pardon the offense
as provided. In the case of conviction for
treason, the governor may suspend execution
of the sentence until the case is reported to
the Legislature at its next session. The
Legislature shall then either pardon or
commute the sentence, or direct its
execution.
(5) In determining when, where, and under
what conditions offenders serving sentences
may be released upon parole, pardoned, have
restitution ordered, or have their fines or
forfeitures remitted, or their sentences
commuted or terminated, the Board of Pardons
shall consider whether the persons have made
A _

or are prepared to make restitution as
ascertained in accordance with the standards
and procedures of Section 76-3-201, as a
condition of any parole, pardon, remission of
fines or forfeitures, or commutation or
termination of sentence.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Defendant, Daryl Wayne Seagroves, was charged with
aggravated assault and misdemeanor assault in Fifth Judicial
District Court, in and for Iron County, before the Honorable J.
Philip Eves.

He pled guilty on the first day of trial to

assault, a class B misdemeanor in violation of Utah Code Ann. §
76-5-102 (1978).

He was then tried by a jury and convicted of

aggravated assault, a third degree felony in violation of Utah
Code Ann. § 76-5-103 (1978).

Defendant was sentenced to up to

five years in the Utah State Prison for the aggravated assault
conviction.

He was sentenced to a consecutive six-month term in

the Iron County Jail for the misdemeanor assault conviction.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On New Year's Eve, December 31, 1988, and early morning
on New Year's Day, January 1, 1989, defendant was drinking at the
Playhouse Bar in Cedar City, Utah (T. 56-58).

After the bar

closed, defendant and others (including his girlfriend, Deborah
Seagroves; a friend, Terry Gideon; and the bar doorman, Kurt
Mackay) assembled outside the bar prior to leaving (PH 23).
Defendant's girlfriend wanted to use the bathroom, so the
doorman, Kurt Mackay, let her in the back door of the bar (PH 8).

References are made to the preliminary hearing transcript
(hereinafter M PH"), the trial transcript
(hereinafter H T M ) , and
H M
the district court file (hereinafter R ) .

After exiting the bar, as they were walking around a corner,
defendant blindsided Mackay with a blow to the side of the head
(PH 23). The blow knocked him to the ground (PH 24), and
defendant then proceeded to stomp on his head (PH 25). Mackay
suffered a cracked skull and jaw, a concussion, a split lip, and
a bruised ear (PH 10, 11, 15). Prior to trial, defendant pled
guilty to a class B misdemeanor assault for his attack on Mackay
(T. 35). Consequently, Mackay did not testify at trial and the
details related to that assault were not presented to the jury.
After leaving the bar, defendant and three others left
for the American Siesta Motel where they were living (T. 62).
Defendant's girlfriend, Deborah Seagroves, was afraid of him and
refused to ride with him, so Terry Gideon took her home;
Seagroves intended to pick up her baby and some clothes and spend
the night with a friend (T. 61). Defendant drove in a separate
car (T. 62). Shortly after arriving at the motel, defendant
became involved in an argument with Gideon (T. 68). Defendant
became enraged and threatened to kill Gideon (T. 68). Part of
the argument took place while defendant was seated in a car and
Gideon was standing five feet from the car (T. 68). In an effort
to calm defendant down, Gideon approached the car and reached
inside to hold defendant (T. 68). After some scuffling and
grabbing, Gideon stepped away from the car and realized that
defendant had stabbed him several times with a knife (T. 70).
Gideon left to seek medical attention (T. 72). Gideon's eleven
stab wounds were located on his back, neck, chest, leg and near
his left eye (T. 34-37); the wounds required suturing (T. 80).

After defendant stabbed Gideon, he ran inside the motel
and exclaimed to Scott Quinton, defendant's roommate, that he had
gotten in a fight with Gideon and "cut him pretty bad" (T. 64,
66).

Defendant saw the police outside and got into bed (T. 66).

The police, with the assistance of Deborah Seagroves, located
defendant and he was arrested (T. 49, 51).
After pleading guilty to the assault on the doorman at
the Playhouse Bar, the trial proceeded on the aggravated assault
charge stemming from the incident at the motel (T. 204)
Defendant was found guilty and waived time before sentencing (T.
208).

In view of defendant's background, which includes a 1981

murder conviction in Texas (T. 208), defendant was incarcerated.
He was ordered to serve zero to five years in the Utah State
Prison for aggravated assault on Terry Gideon, and to then serve
six months in the Iron County jail for the assault on Kurt MacKay
(R. 107).
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion in
sentencing defendant to consecutive terms for his aggravated
assault and assault convictions.

There were two victims, who

each sustained significant injuries.

The consecutive sentences

do not constitute a violation of the Utah Constitution, and do
not inappropriately interfere with the discretion of the board of
pardons.

ARGUMENT
POINT I
DEFENDANT WAS PROPERLY SENTENCED TO
CONSECUTIVE TERMS OF INCARCERATION FOR HIS
AGGRAVATED ASSAULT AND MISDEMEANOR ASSAULT
CONVICTIONS.
Defendant's sole claim on appeal is that the trial
court abused its discretion in imposing an indeterminate prison
term of up to five years for the aggravated assault conviction
with a consecutive six month jail term for the simple assault
conviction.

Defendant contends that the imposition of the jail

term following imprisonment is an "unconstitutional interference
with the prerogatives of the Utah State Board of Pardons" and
"inappropriately interferes with the discretion granted to the
Board of Pardons" in setting the date and terms of parole
(Appellant's Opening Brief at 5, State v. Seagroves/ No. 890154CA).

Defendant acknowledges, citing State v. Jolivet, 713 P.2d

707 (Utah 1986), that a trial court has broad discretion in
imposition of sentence, but claims that the trial court abused
its discretion in this instance.

Defendant has cited no legal

authority upon which to base his claim, and for that reason
alone, his argument must fail.

State v. Cook, 714 P.2d 296 (Utah

1986); State v. Williamson, 674 P.2d 132 (Utah 1983).
The trial court has considerable discretion in its
determination of an appropriate sentence, so long as the sentence
is within the bounds of authority authorized by the legislature.
State v. Jolivet, 712 P.2d 843, 844 (Utah 1986).

According to

Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-201(1) (Supp. 1988), the trial court may,
within the limits of other sentencing provisions contained in

Chapter 3, impose any one of the following sentences or a
combination of them:
(a) to pay a fine;
(b) to removal from or disqualification of
public or private office;
(c) to probation unless otherwise
specifically provided by law;
(d) to imprisonment; or
(e) to death.
Further, it is within the discretion of the trial court to
determine whether to impose concurrent or consecutive sentences.
The sentencing court Mmay impose consecutive sentences for
separate offenses committed in the course of a single criminal
episode."

Jolivet, 712 P.2d at 844.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-

401(1) (1978) (amended 1989) provides that "A court shall
determine, if a defendant has been adjudged guilty of more than
one felony offense, whether to impose concurrent or consecutive
sentences for the offenses.

Sentences for state offenses shall

run concurrently unless the court states in the sentence that
they shall run consecutively."

Subsection (9) provides that the

"section may not be construed to limit the authority of a court
to impose consecutive sentences in misdemeanor cases."

The

legislature, therefore, rectified any possible ambituity in the
statute regarding consecutive sentences for misdemeanors by
enacting subsection (9).
The aggregate minimum of all consecutive sentences
imposed may not exceed 12 years.
(1978) (amended 1989).

Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-401

Otherwise, there is no legal limitation

on the imposition of consecutive sentences.
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Defendant's attempts to elevate his claim to a
constitutional dimension must fail.

His claim of a

constitutional violation stems from the imposition of consecutive
sentences and the alleged infringement on the board of pardon's
power to parole.

However, defendant has no constitutional right

to parole at all, or at least not until a parole date has been
established.

Homer v. Morris, 684 P.2d 63, 66 (Utah 1984),

citing Greenholtz v. Inmates of the Nebraska Penal and
Correctional Complex, 442 U.S. 1, 7 (1979) ("[b]efore a parole
date has been established, an inmate has no constitutional right
to be placed on parole"); Swisher v. Hamilton, 12 Kan. App. 2d
183, 740 P.2d 94 (1987); State v. Dictado, 102 Wash.2d 277, 687
P.2d 172 (1984); Dorman v. State, 665 P.2d 511 (Wyo. 1983).
Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court recognized in
State v. Bishop, 717 P.2d 261 (Utah 1986), that prior to 1980,
Article VII, section 12 of the Utah Constitution gave the board
of pardons virtually unfettered discretion in determining parole
dates and limitations.

However, after the 1980 amendment, the

discretion of the Board became subject to "such conditions as may
be established by the Legislature. . . . "

Id.., citing Utah

Const, art. VII, S 12. The Bishop court upheld the
constitutionality of the power of the legislature to enact
provisions which affect the board's parole decisions.

In the

present case, the legislature has provided for the imposition of
consecutive sentences.
1989).

Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-401 (1978) (amended

The imposition of the consecutive six month jail sentence

in this case does not unconstitutionally interfere with the
prerogatives of the board of pardons.
.in-

Defendant also asserts that the sentence in this case
"inappropriately interferes with the discretion granted to the
Board of Pardons in setting the conditions and terms of parole
and may even be seen to interfere with the Board of Pardon's
discretion in setting an earlier release date" and may preclude
the board from "requiring a term in a half-way house."
Appellant's Opening Brief at 5-6.

Defendant's claim does not

rise to the level of a constitutional violation, as he asserts,
which would entitle him to relief.

Regardless, the manner in

which defendant's sentence was imposed in this case does not
shackle the board's authority.

The board of pardons does not

have authority over the class B misdemeanor conviction.

Utah

Code Ann. S§ 77-27-5 (Supp. 1989) and 77-27-9 (Supp. 1989).
However, it has authority to place defendant on parole for three
years.

Utah Code Ann. S 76-3-202(1) (Supp. 1988).

Consequently,

once the board determines defendant's release date, assuming it
is less than the maximum five year period and his sentence is not
terminated, defendant could then be placed on parole for three
years.

During the initial six-month term of the three year

period, defendant would serve the jail term.

The board would

continue to have jurisdiction over the defendant for two and one
half years and could subsequently determine what terms and
conditions would be required as a condition of parole, Utah Code
Ann. S 77-27-5 (Supp. 1989), which could include placement in a
half way house if deemed appropriate.
The imposition of the consecutive six-month jail term
does not unconstitutionally infringe upon the power of the board

-11-

of pardons.

Defendant assaulted two people.

The assault on Kurt

Mackay, although charged as a misdemeanor, was significant;
defendant fractured his skull and jaw as the result of striking
him with his fist and stomping on his head.

The assault on Terry

Gideon was also significant; defendant stabbled him with a knife
eleven times.
murder.

Defendant was convicted in 1981 in Texas for

Given his background and his assault on two people, it

is entirely appropriate that he be given a severe sentence,
including consecutive sentences for the two convictions.
CONCLUSION
The defendant, Daryl Wayne Seagroves, was properly
sentenced to consecutive terms of zero to five years in prison
and to six months in the county jail for aggravated assault and
misdemeanor assault convictions, respectively.

For the foregoing

reasons, and any additonal reasons advanced at oral argument, the
State of Utah respectfully requests that this Court affirm the
judgment of the trial court.
REPSECTFULLY submitted this jfj^day of August, 1989.
R. PAUL VAN DAM
Utah Attorney General
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